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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
JONATHAN LITTLE and 
. 
HANNAH LITTLE, . 
Plaintiff-Respondents, Case No. 
18113 
. 
. 
-vs-
UTAH STATE DIVISION 
OF FAMILY SERVICES, 
. 
. 
Defendants-Appellants. 
. 
. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
STATKMENT OF THE CASE 
This was a wrongful death action brought by the 
natural parents of Jennifer Little, a child who died while 
in foster care. Judgment was entered against the Utah 
Division of Family Services and damages awarded in the 
amount of $20,000. The Division of Family Services appeals 
that judgment. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The Third District Court, Judge Christine Durham, 
presiding, denied a motion to dismiss as to the Division of 
Family Services on July 13, 1979. Trial was held August 12 
and 13, 1981, in the Third District Court before Judge Kenneth 
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Rigtrup. Judgment was entered against the Division of Family 
Services and $20,000 damages awarded. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The Appellant Division of Family Services seeks 
reversal of the denial of the Motion to Dismiss, and reversal 
of the judgment entered by Judge Rigtrup. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Jennifer Little, the 2 1/2 year-old daughter of 
the respondents, was removed from the custody of her parents 
-
by the Juvenile Court on April 6, 1977 (R. p. lOlY. The child was 
placed in the custody of the Utah Division of Family Services 
and placed first in a shelter home, then in a foster home in 
late April, 1977 (T. pp. 7, 20). The foster parents, Russell 
and Pearl Meik, were trained for therapeutic foster care, with 
emphasis placed on children with handicaps or special behavioral 
or emotional problems (T. pp. 15,16,69,70). 
Jennifer Little had a history 'of behavioral and 
physical difficulties (T. pp. 47), and had been characterized 
as having autistic tendencies. One symptom exhibited by 
Jennifer was "head-banging," or the habit of hitting her head 
against stationary objects (T. p. 21). 
The Meiks had several other foster children in their 
home, including Floyd Hooten, a 17 year-old, mildly retarded 
boy (T. P~ 17). Floyd had, on several occasions, been asked 
-2-
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to babysit for both the Meik's children and their neighbors' 
children (T. pp. 261). A neighbor, Scott Lang, testified 
that Floyd was very responsible and gentle with the younger 
children, and had never been known to hit them or to exhibit 
any other violent or aggressive behavior toward the children 
(T. p. 262). 
Connie Cowley, an experienced foster care worker, 
was assigned by the Division of Family Services to supervise 
the foster children placed in the Meik home, including 
Jennifer Little (T. p. 45). She arranged for medical and 
psychological testing of Jennifer, as well as specialized 
treatment and training through Project Pitch and the 
Developmental Disability Program (T. p. 54). When Mrs. 
Meik discussed Jennifer's head-banging with Connie Cowley, 
explaining that she always kept Jennifer nearby and held 
her during head-banging episodes so she would not hurt 
herself, the worker did not instruct Mrs. Meik to take any 
further action (T. p. 52). However, Jennifer had redently 
been medically examined, at the arrangement of Mrs. Cowley, 
and was scheduled for further medical and psychological 
treatment. 
On June 4, 1977, two months after olacernent in the 
~ 
Meik foster home, Jennifer Little died of massive brain 
hemorrhage caused by sharp blows to the head (T. pp. 945, 119). 
-3-
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On that day, the child had been left for a short time in the 
care of her foster brother, Floyd Hooten. According to the 
police reports which were admitted as evidence, Floyd Hooten 
did inflict several blows to Jennifer Little's head on the 
day she died. 
In December, 1978, Jonathan and Hannah Little, 
respondents, filed suit against the Utah Division of Family 
Services, alleging negligent placement and supervision of 
.their child while in foster care. Defendants' Motion-to 
Dismiss (April 5, 1979) based, among other things, on 
the Governmental Immunity Act, was denied as to the 
Division of Family Services, the lower court finding that 
the discretionary function exception did not apply to this 
case (R.pp.62,64). The State appealed the denial of the 
Motion to Dismiss {R. p. 83), but the interlocutory appeal 
was rejected by this Court (R. p. 103). 
The State brought a Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment in April, 1981, which was granted, dismissing the 
Second and Fourth claims in the complaint (R.p. 136). 
The first and third claims were remaining for trial which 
was set for August 12, 1981. After a two-day trial, judgment 
was entered for plaintiffs-respondents, and damages were 
awarded in the amount of $20,000. 
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POINT I 
IT WAS ERROR TO DENY THE APPELLANT 
DIVISION OF FAMILY SERVICES' MOTION 
TO DISMISS BASED ON THE UTAH 
GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT. 
The Division of Family Services brought a Motion 
to Dismiss in April, 1979, on.the basis that plaintiffs' 
claims, which were founded upon the alleged negligence of the 
State in selecting and supervising the foster care placement 
of Jennifer Little, were barred by the Utah Governmental 
Immunity Act. Although granted in part, the Motion was 
denied as to the major issues and defendants in this action. 
The defendants/appellants asserted that governmental immunity 
should apply to this action because the foster care worker 
assigned to Jennifer Little necessarily was performing a 
"discretionary function" for which immunity is retained 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10(1). The district court 
held that the decisions relating to the placement, care and 
supervision of a child in a foster home are not discretionary. 
The appellants urge this court to very carefully consider 
the inununity question presented here. If governmental 
immunity is not retained for a program such as foster care, 
there could be serious consequences to the continued existence 
of individualized foster care. The State simply cannot 
-5-
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afford to be put in the position of an insurer, guaranteeing 
that nothing will ever happen to a foster child. If 
decisions regarding particular placements, ca.re and treat-
ment are to be continually at risk, those decisions will 
simply no longer be made. The State would have to protect 
itself and its workers by ·returning to institutionalized 
foster care, where the children can be watched around the 
clock. 
Two questions.need consideration by the court; 
1. Although not raised below, it IEi.Ust be 
determined whether maintenance of a foster ca.re program 
is a governmental function within the meaning of the 
Utah Governmental Irrununity Act. 
2. Does the discretionary function exception to 
the general waiver of immunity for negligence apply to this 
case? 
A 
THE DIVISION OF FAMILY SERVICES 
IS IMMUNE FROM SUIT FOR INJURIES 
WHICH RESULT FROM THEIR EXERCISE 
OF A GOVERNMENTAL FUNCTION. 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-3 reads: 
Except as may be otherwise provided 
in this act, all governmental entities are 
immune from suit for any injury which results 
from the exercise of a goverrunentai function, 
governmentally-owned hospital, n-u:rsing home, 
or other governmental health care facility. 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-3 (1953). 
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Respondents based their claims on the alleged negligence 
of the Division of Family Services in the placement and super-
vision of Jennifer Little in foster care. However, the place-
ment and supervision of foster care children is a governmental 
function conducted by the Division of Family Services for the 
State of Utah pursuant to statutory mandate, Utah Code Ann. 
§ 55-15b-l, et seq., and therefore comes within the purview 
of Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-3. Traditionally courts have 
analyzed the nature of activity in which a governmental entity 
. . . 
is ~ngaged to determine whether it is a governmental function 
or a proprietary function. In Standiford v. Salt Lake City 
Corporation, 605 P.2d 1230 (1980) the Utah Supreme Court 
described several factors used by Utah courts in the past 
to determine whether a governmental function was involved. 
These included whether the activity was furnished for the 
general public good, whether there was pecuniary profit 
involved, and whether the activity was of such a nature as to 
be in real competition with free enterprise. The Co~rt in 
Standiford, however, decided that a new test would be more 
appropriate and applied a test adopted by the Michigan Supreme 
Court. This test calls for determining whether the activity 
under consideration is of such a unique nature that it can 
only be performed by a governmental agency or that is essential 
to the core of governmental activity. Although this test 
-7-
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breaks abruptly with past precedent and is criticized 
vigorously by the dissenting judges, its application to 
the Division of ·Family Services' duties involved here 
still results in their categorization as governmental 
functions, __ as does the application of previous, mor~ 
established tests. The Division of Family Services 
provides a service which is furnished for the general public 
good, it derives no pecuniary profit from its activities, 
and is not in real comp~tition with free enterprise. 
The legislature has given the Division of Family Services 
the statutory duty to provide foster care, which indicates 
that the legislature considers this as an essential govern-
mental function. The placement and supervision of foster 
children is in no way comparable to the operation of a golf 
course which the Court found in Standiford to be a non-
essential governmental function. Similarly, foster care 
does not compare to the maintenance of a sewer system (Thomas 
v. Clearfield City, No. 17338, filed February 24, 1982) or 
a sledding hill in a park, Johnson v. Salt Lake City Corp., 
629 P.2d 432 (Utah, 1981). Accordingly, this duty performed 
by the Division of Family Services should be considered a 
governmental function, and due to Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-3 
the Division of Family Services is immune from suit for injury 
resulting from the exercise of this function. 
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B 
THE DIVISION OF FAMILY SERVICES 
IS IMMUNE FROM SUIT FOR INJURIES 
RESULTING FROM THE PERFORMANCE 
OR FAILURE TO PERFORM A DISCRETIONARY 
FUNCTION. 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10(1) specifies certain 
exceptions to the general .waiver of governmental immunity 
for injuries proximately caused by negligent acts or 
omissions committed by a governmental entity. 
Immunity from suit of all governmental 
entities is waived for injury proximately 
caused by a negligent act or omission of an 
employee conunitted within the scope of his 
employment except if the injury: 
(1) arises out of the exercise or 
performance or the failure to exercise or 
perform a discretionary function, whether 
or not the discretion is abused. . . . 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10 (1) (1953) (emphasis added). 
To determine whether a governmental activity is discretionary 
or non-discretionary many courts now apply the planning-
operational test. 35 Am.Jur. Federal Tort Claims Act § 19; 
Carroll v. State Road Commission, 496 P.2d 888 (Utah, 1972). 
To apply such a test to particular conduct, a court need only 
determine to what stage or level of decision-making the alleged 
negligent activity belongs. If the conduct pertains to the planning 
level it is discretionary, and if it pertains to the 
operational level it is non-discretionary. However, this 
neat dichotomy is not always helpful or accurate in 
determining whether a certain activity is discretionary or 
not. 
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The planning-operational level test may be 
workable when building a highway or designing a flight 
pattern, but it.is simply inapplicable to a situation where 
the decisions at both the superior and subordinate levels 
deal with the care and needs of a particular person. It 
is very difficult to define an "operational level" in 
terms of the care of a human being. 
For example, in the Carroll case, supra, the Utah 
Supreme Court gave some general guidelines as to what 
-
constitutes operational level decision-rnak~ng. " [O]pera-
tional level acts are those which concern routine, everyday 
matters, not requiring evaluation of broad policy factors." 
496 P.2d at 891. 
The Court further stated: 
... the decision of the road 
supervisor to use berms as the sole means 
·of protection for the unwary traveler 
was not a basic policy decision essential 
to the realization or accomplishment of some 
basic government policy, program or objective. 
His decision did not require the exercise 0£ 
basic policy evaluation, judgment, or 
expertise on the part of the Road Commission. 
496 P.2d at 891. 
In the present case, on the other hand, the 
decisions of Family Service employees regarding the place-
ment, care and supervision of Jennifer Little or any other 
foster child are far from everyday, routine matters. They 
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do require the exercise of basic policy evaluations, 
judgment, and expertise on the part of the foster care worker. 
The realization and accomplishment of the foster care 
program rests upon the ability and freedom of foster care workers 
at any level to evaluate the needs of a particular child and 
the services that can be provided to that child by a particular 
foster family, and make whatever placement seems to be in the 
best interests of the child. 
Subsequent to its decision in Carroll, supra, the 
Utah Supreme Court applied the discretionary £unction excep-
tion in a case factually much more similar to the present case. 
In Epting v. State, 546 P.2d 242 (Utah, 1976), the 
State of Utah was sued by a family of a person killed by a 
prisoner who had escaped from a work release program 
conducted by the Utah State Prison. The court held that the 
handling of a particular prisoner ''arises out of the exercise 
of a discretionary function for which subsect~on (1) of Section 
63-30-10 quoted above has retained sovereign immunity." 546 
P.2d at 244. 
The court's discussion of the discretionary nature 
of decisions regarding persons in the State's custody is 
instructive: 
-11-
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In regard to the problem: whether 
the placing of a prisoner in a 'work release' 
program comes within subsection (1) above 
quoted as 'the exercise ... [of] •.. a 
discretionary function, ... ,' we make the 
following observations: The prison authorities 
are faced with the dilemma which has always 
existed in penal institutions: as to what 
extent they are furnishing an education for 
further crime, or for the rehabilitation of 
prisoners into useful citizenship. We think 
there is not much doubt that the use of work 
release programs is a worthwhile effort toward 
the latter objective. But that is within the 
discretion of the prison authorities to decide. 
In addition to the exercise of this judgment 
as to the value and practicability of such a 
program generally, there are problems about_ its 
advisability as to each individual prisoner. -
In order to weigh the positive values of possible 
benefit for him in such a program against the 
negative factors- such as the likelihood of his 
escaping and engaging in more antisocial conduct, 
it is essential to consider the various aspects 
of his personality: his intelligence, aptitudes 
and qualities of character such as honesty, 
integrity and industry; and whether he has 
demonstrated a sincere desire to rehabilitate 
himself so that there is a reasonable probability 
that he will succeed. Accordingly, we agree 
with the view of the trial court that the 
handling of the prisoner Michael Hart was some-
thing which 'arises out of the exercise of a 
discretionary function' for which subsection (1) 
of Section 63-·30-10 quoted above has retained 
sovereign inununity. 
546 P.2d at 244 (emphasis added). 
In Epting the court did not attempt to apply the 
planning-operational level test espoused in Carroll, supra. 
Human conduct, and the problems of caring for human beings 
do not lend themselves well to neat definitions or tests. 
-12-
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Several other courts have recognized that what 
appears to be conducted at the operational level is in reality 
a discretionary.function. In Evangelical Un~ted Breth. Church 
of Adna v. State, 67 Wash.2d 246, 407 P.2d 44~ (1966), the 
plaintiff Church brought action against the state fqr the loss 
of its church which was destroyed by a boy who escaped from 
an "open program" work detail at a state juv-elraile correction 
facility. The Court found that the decision to assign the boy 
to a program with more :t:"elaxed security measures was not 
-
operational level conduct but rather purely d1scretionary. 
To this end, it calls into play 
the exercise of executive expertisew 
evaluation and judgment in an area 
involving many variable human, emo-
tional and psychological factors and 
about which widely divergent opinions 
c.an and do exist. The decisions 
required are not unlike those called 
for in the legislative and judicial 
processes of government . . . The 
decisions involved were, within-the 
framework of necessary executive ana 
administrative processes of government, 
purely discretionary, if not in fac:t 
quasi-judicial in character. 
(Emphasis added.) 
407 P.2d at 447. 
Similarly, the Court in Jarret v. Wills, 235 Ore. 51, 383 P.2d 
995 (1963) , recognized that decisions concerning the amount of 
supervision required for a particular individual must necessarily 
be discretionary. Referring to a superintendent of a home for 
-13-
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the mentally deficient the Court stated: 
His responsibilities require him to 
make constant discretionary judgment. Like 
the Board of Parole and Probation or the 
Superintendent of the State Hospital, he is 
required as the State's keeper of these 
unfortunates and in behalf of the state, to 
judge and govern human beings and human 
conduct, a judgment devoid of any of the 
standard weights and measures available for· 
the decisions made by other public officials. 
There would be few of his decisions that 
would not be discretionary. 383 P.2d at 998. 
These cases are particularly pertinent to the duties involved 
in-the placement_and supervision of Jennifer Little. All 
three courts recognized that discretion on the part of the 
employees was necessary for the proper functioning of the 
program involved. Similarly, the foster care program requires 
the foster care workers to exercise their discretion concerning 
their own assessments of the homes, families and children 
involved. Without this element of discretion a foster care 
program could not function, for not all foster children and 
foster parents are alike. Simple operational level decisions 
cannot possible apply to the program. All foster care decisions 
are of necessity discretionary. 
The Utah Supreme Court recently stated that it had 
always followed the lead of cases interpreting the Federal 
Tort Claims Act in using the planning-operational level test 
to separate discretionary from non-discretionary governmental 
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functions. Frank v. State, 613 P.2d 517 (1980). However, 
federal courts have recognized the limitations on the 
applicability of this test. In a leading case dealing with 
the meaning of the word "discretion" as used by the Federal 
Tort Claims Act, the court recognized that the plan~ing 
level of government action goes farth~r than the initiation 
of programs by administrations. (This is contrary to the 
decision of the district court in the present case.) 
... [t]he discretionarv function or 
duty . includes more than-· the initiation 
of programs ·and activities. tt also includes 
determinations made by executives or admini-
strators in establishing plans, specifications, 
or schedules of operations. Where there is 
room for policy judgment and decision there is 
discretion. It necessarily follows that acts 
of subordinates in carrying out the operations 
of government in accordance with official 
directions cannot be actionable. If it were 
not so, the protection of§ 2680(a) would 
fail at a time it would be needed, that is, 
when a subordinate performs or fails to per-
form a causal step, each action or non-action 
being directed by the supervisor, exercising, 
perhaps abusing, discretion. ·(Emphasis added.) 
Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 73 S.Ct. 956- (1953), 
Id. At 36. 
The United States District Court in Sullivan v. United States, 
129 F.Supp. 713 (N.D.Ill. 1955) also recognized the necessity 
for an extension of the ideas of planning level discretionary 
action. That court held that any activity of a government 
employee at the operational level performed in accordance 
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with the official plan or program constitutes performance 
of a discretionary function since its source is discretionary. 
·Also, federal courts have shown an unwillingness 
to apply the test where the performance at the operational 
level is not clearly spelled out by exact specifications. 
Recently, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals in Barton v. 
-
United States, 609 F.2d 977 (10th Cir. 1979), upheld the 
trial court's decision in dismissing a claim against the 
Bureau of Land Management for injury caused a rancher in 
t~rnporarily denying grazing sights. The court found the 
Bureau of Land Management's decision to be discretionary 
and thus, the Bureau of Land Management was immune from 
suit for resulting injury. In assessing what functions 
constitute discretionary functions the court stated: 
Concisely stated, the rule is that if--
a government official in performing his 
statutory duties must act without reliance 
upon a fixed or readily ascertainable stand-
ard, the decision he makes is discretionary 
and within the exception of the Tort Claims 
Act. 
Id. at 979. 
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A United States District Court also found that non-specific 
duties imposed on governmental entities necessarily are 
discretionary functions. In Gray v. United States, 445 
F.Supp. 337 (S.D. Texas 1978), the court found that deter-
mining what is "safe for use" is a discretionary function 
performed by the Federal Drug Administration. The court 
distinguished this kind of duty from that in Griffin v. 
United States, 500 F.2d 1059 (3rd Cir. 1974), where the 
Federal Tort Claims Act_discretionary function exception 
did not bar suit in review of the specific. detailed criteria 
listed in the regulation governing the agency. Gray v. U.S., 
at 341. 
The Division of Family Services has no specific 
detailed criteria on the placement and superv~sion of foster 
children. At most, there are general guidelines. Anything 
more narrow would have to be non-functional because the 
varying needs of the special problems of the children invol-
ved require varying levels and degrees of supervision- and 
treatment. If the case workers for the foster care program 
were forced to work constrained by a narrow set of operational 
rules, all foster children would get the· same kind of treat-
ment and supervision regardless of their special needs. This 
would be highly undesirable. The result is that the foster 
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care program is not run on an operational level but is 
necessarily discretionary. 
The fact that certain programs run by the state 
are necessarily discretionary is one of the main reasons 
for the retention of governmental immunity. Because 
governmental custodial programs are found to be desirable 
and necessary, whether they be penal or health care pro-
grams, it is necessary that they not be threatened by 
continual civil actions. Twenty-four hour supervision 
in custodial programs is neither desirable nor feasible 
in all cases. If governmental immunity is not allowed for 
these programs their very existence is threatened if there 
is liability for any accident which might occur. 
The policy of allowing governmental immunity to 
protect the quality and existence of beneficial programs 
has been upheld by this Court. In Blonquist v. Summit 
County, 25 Utah 2d 387, 481 P.2d 430 (1971), the Court 
noted: 
It is of great importance to public 
officials, to the governmental unit they act 
in behalf of, and even mo.re important to the 
stability and efficiency of government, that 
public officials should not be held liable for 
damages for acts done in good faith in the per-
formance of their duties where the exercise of 
any discretion is involved even though they may 
make a mistake in judgment. The general law is 
quite uniformly to that effect. 
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* * *It would be quite impractical and 
unfair to require them to act at their own 
risk. This would not only be disruptive of the 
proper functioning of public institutions, 
but-undoubtedly would dissuade competent and re-
sponsible persons from accepting the responsi-
bilities of public office. Accordingly, it is 
the settled policy of the law that when a public 
official acts in good faith, believing what he does 
to be within the scope of his authority arid in the 
line of his duty, he is not liable for damages 
even if he makes a mistake in the exercise of his 
judgment. 
483 P.2d at 434! 436. 
Likewise, in Sheffield v. Turner, 2 Utah 2d 314, 445 
P.2d 367, 369 (1968), the Court stated that there-is: 
. the imperative need for those able 
in a supervisory capacity to have reasonable 
freedom to discharge the burdensome responsibil-
ities of keeping in confinement and maintaining 
discipline of a large number of men who have been 
convicted of serious crime. If such officials are 
too vulnerable to lawsuits for anything untoward 
which may happen to inmates a number of evils fol-
low, including a breakdown of discipline, and the 
fact that capable persons would be discouraged 
from taking such public positions. 
Whether certain governmental action will be classified as 
discretionary and thus allowed governrnenatl irmnuni ty- may rest 
squarely on the decision whether the challenged action is 
considered operational or planning. For this reason the court 
in Emch v. United States, 630 F.2d 523, 527 (7th Cir. 1980), con-
cluded that the determination of whether an action should 
be deemed operational or planning must be made by considering 
whether governmental immunity is desired for the activity 
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involved . 
. . . ITJhe existence of a discretionary 
function, and thus the potential for 
governmental liability under the Federal 
Tort Claims Act, ultimately rests upon the 
characterization of the challenged behavior 
as "policy" or operations." In making this 
determination, relevant considerations in-
clude whether or not the nature of the judg-
· ment exercised called for policy considera-
tions, Griffin v. United States, 500 F.2d 
1059 (3rd Cir. 1974), and whether the Act 
complained of is "the result of a judgment 
or decision which it is necessary that the 
Government official be free to make without 
fear or threat of vexatious or fictitious 
suits and alleged personal liability," Ove 
Gustavsson Contracting Co. v. Floete, 2-gg-
F. 2 d 6 5 5 , 6 5 9 ( 2 d Cir. 19 6 2) . 
The risk of liability to the Division of Family 
Services would be too great if it could be held responsible 
for any accident occurring in a foster home. The only way 
to protect against such liability, absent governmental 
irrununity, would be to return to institutional child care. 
Such a solution is obviously contrary to the best interests 
of children needing foster care. 
The compelling need for governmental inununity for 
the Division of Family Services to allow the continuance of 
the foster care program requires that the waiver of· governmental 
irrununity be read narrowly and that the discretionary acts of 
the Division of Family Services foster care workers be inunune 
from suit as is the clear intention of the Utah Governmental 
Immunity Act. 
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POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING DR. 
JANICE SARGEANT TO TESTIFY. 
Dr. Janice Sargeant was called by Plaintiffs below 
to give expert testimony regarding treatment for autistic 
children, particularly those who exhibit head-banging. The 
Defendants objected to the admission of Dr. Sargeant's 
testimony (T. p. 128) based upon Rule 56(2), Utah Rules of 
Evidence, which states: 
If the witn~ss is testifying ~s an expert~ 
testimony of the witness in tne form of -
opinions or inferences is limited to such 
opinions as the judge finds are (a) based 
on facts or dates perceived by or personally 
known or made known to the witness at the 
hearing, and (b) within the scope of the 
special knowledge, skill, experience or training 
possessed by the witness. 
Rule 56 is concerned with the admissibility of expert evidence 
and 56(2) in particular is· designed to insure that expert 
evidence that is admitted has a proper foundation. Dr. 
Sargeant's testimony did not have adequate foundation 
for two reasons. 
First, the facts on which Dr. Sargeant based her 
testimony were insufficient. It was well established in 
voir dire that Dr. Sargeant had no personal first hand 
knowledge of Jennifer or her problems. She had never inter-
viewed or evaluated Jennifer and had seen only one report 
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where Jennifer had been described as manifesting "autistic 
behavior." (T. p. 141). Dr. Sargeant then went on to 
give testimony on treatment for autistic children (T. p. 139). 
There was no evidence at trial that Jennifer was ever clearly 
diagnosed as autistic. Therefore, Dr. Sargeant's testimony 
was not supported by the facts. 
In the Utah Supreme Court case Day v. Lorenzo Smith 
and Son, Inc., 17 Utah 2d 221, 408 P.2d 186 (1965), it was 
held that the trial court did not err in disallowing testimony 
-by a police officer who did not have sufficient first hand 
knowledge to testify. The officer had been at the scene of 
the accident but did not personally observe the impact·. 
Officer Sherwood's credentials were not in issue. There was 
no question that twenty-four years of experience in investi-
gating accidents qualified officer Sherwood to testify as 
to the general subject of automobile accidents. Similarly, 
in the instant case, there are no objections to Dr. Sargeant's 
qualifications to testify about possible ways to treat 
autistic children. In Day, notwithstanding officer Sherwood's 
expertise, the Supreme Court held that his testimony concern-
ing conclusions about the impact was not supported by 
sufficient facts and thus was not admissible. In this case, 
~r. Sargeant testified in the area of proper treatment for 
autistic children when there was no evidence to indicate 
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Jennifer was ever diagnosed as autistic. Dr. Sargeant 
testified that a child had serious problems if head-banging 
started suddenly at age two and one half when there was no 
evidence whatsoever that Jennifer never banged her head 
until age two and one-half or that Jennifer fit into the 
category of children Dr. Sargeant was referring to as 
"head-bangers." Dr. Sargeant also testified extensively 
about possible treatment methods for head-bangers, which 
the trial judge relied ~pon heavily in making his final 
decision. However, Dr. Sargeant had never observed Jennifer 
Little in the act of head-banging, had never examined her, 
and was not even present in the courtroom to hear other 
witnesses describe Jennifer's behavior. Dr. Sargeant had 
no actual knowledge regarding Jennifer's head-banging, and 
had no idea whether her problem fit into the same category 
as the serious head-bangers about whom she was testifying. 
In short, Dr. Sargeant testified as to matters lacking 
in foundation and unsupported by the facts of the case. 
Admitting her testimony was error under both Day v. Lorenzo 
Smith and Son, Inc., and Utah Rule of Evidence 56(2) (a). 
Defendants continued their objections to this testimony at 
trial (T. pp. 150-151). 
The second reason:that there was insufficient 
foundation for Dr. Sargeant's testimony is that her testimony 
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was based on what she had been told by the appellee's 
attorney, Mr. Littlefield. It was established at trial 
on cross examination that Dr. Sargeant had not been present 
to hear the testimony of any of the other _witnesses and 
therefore could not have based her testimony on information 
given by the other witnesses (T .. p. 127). Any familiarity 
she had with the facts of the case she gained outside the 
court room. 
In Edwards v. Didericksen, 597 P.2d 1328 (Utah, 1979), 
the-Supreme Court of Utah held that testimony regarding 
conclusions of the expert witness from talking to witnesses 
before trial was properly disallowed. The court explained, 
"The expertise of the witness, his degree of familiarity 
with the necessary facts, and the logical nexus between his 
opinion and the facts adduced must be established." Id. at 
133-··In his objection to the trial court allowing Dr. 
Sargeant to testify Mr. Barlow (co-counsel for defendant below) 
pointed out the hearsay problem involved (T. p. 128).- This 
problem was also recognized by the Supreme Court in 
Didericksen: 
The question posed in the instant case was not 
limited to testimony which was adduced at trial; 
it clearly opened the door to hearsay evidence 
gleaned from talking with persons outside the 
court room whose testimony may not have been 
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admitted or admissable at trial. The 
interjection of such hearsay testimony, 
cloaked in the form of an expert opinion, 
would have been impermissible and poten-
tially highly prejudicial. 
597 P.2d at 1332. 
Therefore, not only was Dr. Sargeant 1 s testimony 
based on an inadequate factual predicate, but on hearsay as 
well. The fact that the trial court refused to strike Dr. 
Sargeant's testimony was not only error, but prejudicial 
error. The trial judge_was obviously swayed by the doctor's 
list of possible ways to treat a child wlth a head--banging 
problem. The judge decided the Division of Family Service's 
negligence on the basis that the Division had not employed 
one of the several treatments suggested by Dr. Sargeant 
(namely protective headgear). The trial judge's substantial 
reliance on evidence which lacked adequate foundation renders 
admission of the testimony prejudicial error. 
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POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT 
THE DIVISION OF FAMILY SERVICES WAS 
NEGLIGENT. 
In finding that the Division of Family Services 
was negligent in the care of Jennifer Little, ·Judge Rigtrup 
stated that the Division had "a duty to exercise reasonable 
care in affording protection to the child." (T.p. 273). 
Later, in further discussing his decision, the Judge charac-
terized the duty as the "duty to protect." (.T.p. 274). The 
-
court then went on to find that said duty was breached by 
the failure to provide protective headgear to Jennifer 
(T. pp. 273,274). Jennifer eventually died, and the Division 
of. Family Services "was held liable for the death although 
there was no finding or evidence that the "negligence" of 
the Division in not buying a helmet proximately caused the 
death (See Point IV, below). The description of duty and 
the resultant liability in this case set a very dangerous 
precedent. If the duty is one of blanket "protection-," 
then the State could be found to have breached that duty 
whenever anything happens to a foster child, regardless 
of the reasonableness of the actions taken by the foster 
care workers. In effect, this case, if followed, would 
create a standard of strict liability. 
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In announcing his decision, Judge Rigtrup attached 
"reasonableness" to the standard of care, or duty to protect. (T. 
p. 273). However, his finding of negligence seems to totally ignore 
all the evidence of reasonableness. The only finding of 
negligence was based on the failure of the Division to 
provide, or instruct the foster parents to provide, protective 
head gear (a helmet) . (T. pp. 273-274). Even that 
expectation is unreasonable based on the evidence, and the 
finding of negligence w~s erroneous. Appellants therefore 
request the Court to review the evidence a-nd reverse the 
district court's conclusion that the Division of Family 
Services was negligent. 
The district court only found one instance of 
"negligence"·--the failure to provide a helmet. That finding 
was based upon the testimony of Dr. Janice Sargeant (see 
Point I!), who suggested a helmet as one possible means of 
controlling head-banging. The pertinent portion of Dr. 
Sargeant's testimony follows: 
Q. Are there any means available for controlling 
the head banging behavior? 
A. Yes. 
Q. What are they? 
A. Well, there are a variety. One is selective 
at~ention in that ~ou give attention and lasts of it when 
he s.not head banging, and no attention when he is head 
banging. That would be the first item. Also, you might 
proceed from there to do some kind of punishment procedure, 
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something like using time outs or isolation in a room 
whenever there's head banging. 
Q. Time out? 
A. That would be isolation of the child, or some 
other kind of punishment procedure like overcorrection, 
which involves having a child repeat a certain series 
of behaviors many, many times so that eventually the 
head banging is discouraged. 
' Q. Are you talking about spanking the child or 
striking the child in that situation? 
- A. No. No .. For example, telling the child to stand 
up and sit down, stand up and sit down, stand up and 
sit down, which is one overcorrection procedure. Another 
would be the use of light water spray in his face whenever 
head banging occurs, which is also effective. 
In some cases where .the head banging is intense in 
autistic children, they have even used electric shock 
where there ~as danger of the child's retina detaching 
because the banging was so severe. 
The use of helmets and tranquilizers or drugs or 
sedatives has also been used. There are a variety of 
techniques available for that behavior. 
(T. pp. 132-133.) 
Use of a helmet is only one of many possible responses 
suggested by Dr. Sargeant; in fact, it is almost given as an 
aside at the end of the list. The first method suggested is 
to ignore the head-banging. At trial, the foster mother, 
Mrs. Meik, testified that she kept Jennifer in the same room 
with her at all possible times, and if she became 
concerned that Jennifer might hurt herself from the head-banging, 
she would hold Jennifer until she calmed down (T. pp. 39, 228). 
Thus, Mrs. Meik prevented any serious harm from occurring due 
to the head-banging. (Although there was some testimony as 
to some bruises possibly relating to the head-banging, there 
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was no evidence of serious harm caused by this behavior.) 
Based upon Dr. Sargeant's testimony, giving no specific 
attention to Jennifer's head-banging, except for the efforts 
of Mrs. Meik in restraining her for protection, was reason-
able care. 
Dr. Sargeant also suggested isolating a head banging 
child, spraying water in the child's face, or even using 
electric shock or drugs in some cases. Surely the Division 
of Family Services could not be found negligent for 
-
failure to utilize any one of the many alternative 
suggestions offered by Dr. Sargeant, especially when the 
attraction of that particular method to the Judge seemed 
to be his experience with a helmet used by his nephew who 
was not a head-banger (T. p. 273). 
The foster mother did take reasonable care to 
prevent Jennifer Little from harming herself when she began 
head banging. Furthermore, Connie Cowley had confidence in 
this- foster mother's ability to care for Jennifer in this 
situation because she had previously had another foster child 
with similar behavior (T. pp. 51, 76, 80), and Mrs. Cowley, 
the worker, had seen no indication that Jennifer was seriously 
injuring herself (T. p. 62). Thus, the finding of negligence 
based upon the failure to provide a helmet was clearly in 
error. 
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In the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
(R. pp. 159-162) filed after the trial, to which the 
Appellants repeatedly objected, {R. pp. 149-153), several 
other "violations of duty" are cited which were never even 
mentioned by the Judge in his ruling at trial (See paraqraph 
10, R. p. 160) .. 
The first finding (objected to by appellants, 
paragraph 3, R. p~ 153) was that the Division of Family 
Services failed "to adequately train JENNIFER'S foster 
parents or whoever would take care of the child when the 
foster parents were gone." On the contrary, the Court 
specifically found that "the Meiks were qualified parents, 
were good parents, were conscientious parents ... " (T. 
p. 274). The record also shows that the Meiks were thor-
oughly trained, both as basic and therapeutic foster parents 
{R. pp. 35, 36, 39). The quality and sufficiency of that 
training was never questioned by the Judge. The only mention 
made about lack of direction or training was that the- · 
Division of Family Services never told the Meiks specifically 
that Jennifer should have protective head gear (T. p. 274). 
As has been previously discussed, that single omission 
simply cannot be seen as negligence. 
The second finding (also obejected to by appellants, 
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R. p. 153) was that the Division of Family Services failed 
"to make timely evaluations of her condition to prevent 
potential serious harm and injury." Again, there was 
absolutely no such finding at trial, and no evidence to 
support it. Jennifer Little had been evaluated several 
times before she was removed from her home. (T. p. 57). 
She had been examined at both the University Hospital and 
Primary Children's Hospital (T. p. 55). A treatment plan 
for Jennifer had been d~veloped that would have started that 
summer with a home-based program particlpated in previously 
by the Meiks (PITCH) and would have continued into the fall 
with another program (Developmental Disability Program), 
both programs designed to treat children showing autistic 
tendencies as did Jennifer (R. p. 54). The appellees' expert 
witness, Dr. Sargeant, testified that she believed these 
programs were adequate to treat autistic children (R. p. 145). 
Jennifer's needs.were thoroughly evaluated and treatment 
programs planned. The evidence supports no finding-of 
negligence in this respect. 
The third finding of breach of duty (Paragraph 10 
(c), r. p. 160) relates to the failure to provide a helmet 
previously discussed. It is interesting to note that before 
signing the Findings of Fact, Judqe Riqtrup altered this 
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particular paragraph to state that the helmet would have 
"reduced the risk of possible serious harm and injury." 
There is no finding at all that the failure to provide a 
helmet in fact caused any harm, much less the death. 
Finally, the written Findings of Face included 
the following "violation o"f duty" (again objected to by 
Appellant, R. p. 153): "Lack of proper supervision at all 
times as indicated by allowing the child to be left under the 
supervision arid care of FLOYD HOOTEN, a seventeen (17) year 
old-child who was in the custody of the MEIKS because of 
his own special problems and who slapped the child around 
during said care, triggering cerebral hemorhaging that 
brought about Jennifer's untimely death." No finding of any 
kind relating to Floyd Hooten was made at trial. 
It would certainly go far beyond reasonableness to 
expect a Division of Family Services worker to be present or 
"supervising" at a foster home "at all times." The Division 
cannot assign a worker to supervise every foster home around 
the clock. Further, the evidence shows that it was not at 
all unreasonable to leave Jennifer for a short time in the 
care of Floyd Hooten. Floyd had no history of violent or 
agressive behavior toward children (T. pp. 41, 262), had 
never been known to strike Jennifer or other smaller children, 
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(T. p. 41), and had shown himself to be a responsible 
babysitter (T. p. 262). No amount of supervision by 
the foster care ·worker would have changed the reasonableness 
of leaving Jennifer in Floyd's care. 
Again, the only finding of negligence mad~ by the 
district court judge in his oral ruling was based on the 
failure to provide a helmet. This and all other written 
findings regarding breach of duty are not supported by the 
evidence, and the trial court's finding that the Division 
of Family Services was· negligent was ·error. and should be 
reversed. 
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POINT IV 
THE NEGLIGENCE, IF ANY, OF THE DIVISION 
OF FAMILY SERVICES WAS NOT THE PROXIMATE 
CAUSE OF THE DEATH OF JENNIFER LITTLE. 
Even if the Division of Family Services was negligent 
in failing to provide prote.cti ve headgear to Jenni£ er Little, 
there was-absolutely no evidence or finding that such 
negligence was the proximate cause of Jennifer Little's 
death. In fact, in his oral ruling, Judge Rigtrup stated that 
the actual cause of death was not particularly important to 
the -court: 
Whether or not Jennifer's death 
resulted from a blow or blows by Floyd 
Hooten, or whether it resulted from her 
banging her head on the floor or the wall, 
whether it resulted from the cumulative 
effects of a combination of those incidents 
of trauma, I don't think are really 
particularly important to the Court. 
T. pp. 272-273. Assessing liability against the Division of 
Family Services with no showing or finding of proximate cause 
is reversible error. 
In an action for wrongful death which is based on 
negligence, the plaintiff has the burden of showing not only 
that there was negligence, but also that the negligence was 
the proximate cause of the death. 22 Am.Jur.2d, Peath, § 222. 
Hall v. Blackham, 417 P.2d 664 (Utah, 1966); Thomas v. Bokelman, 
462 P.2d 1020 (Nev. 1970). Negligence and proximate cause are 
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separate concepts. May v. Baklini, 509 P.2d 1345 (N.Mex., 
1973). "Assuming plaintiff made a prima facie showing of 
showing of defendants' negligence, this was insufficient. 
A showing of proximate cause was also required." Id. at 1346. 
In a recent case this Court recognized that the 
plaintiff must sustain the burden of proof on both the issue 
of negligence and the issue of proximate cause. "[W]hile 
there may have been negligence on the part of the defendants, 
such negligence does not automatically render them liable." 
·-
Cooke v. Mortensen, 624 P.2d 675, 676 (Utah, 1981}. As to the 
burden of proof on causation, the court has stated: 
It is a fundamental principle of the 
law of negligence that the person complaining 
has the burden of showing a causal connection 
between the negligent conduct complained of 
and the injury to the plaintiff. 
Sumsion v. Streator-Smith Inc., 132.P.2d 680 (Utah, 1943). 
[T]he evidence must do more than merely 
raise a conjecture or show a probability ..• 
[W]here the proximate cause of the injury is 
left to conjecture, the plaintiff must fail as 
a matter of law. 
Devine v. Cook, 279 P.2d 1073, 1083 {Utah, 1955). 
The plaintiff cannot sustain a case on the mere 
speculation or possibility that the defendant's negligence 
was a cause of the alleged injury. On this subject, Prosser 
stated in Law of Torts, 4th ed., p. 241 that: 
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On the issue of the fact of causation, 
as on other issues essential to his cause of 
action for negligence, the plaintiff, in 
general, has the burden of proof. He must 
introduce evidence which affords a reasonable 
basis for the conclusion that it is more likely 
than not that the conduct of the defendant 
was a substantial factor in bringing about 
the result. A mere possibility of such 
causation is not enough; and when the matter 
-- remains one of pure speculation or conjecture, 
or the probabilities are at best evenly balanced, 
it becomes the duty of the court to direct a 
verdict for the defendant. 
As this Court discussed in Devine v. Cook, supra: 
_ While deductions m~y be based on 
probab1lities, the evidence must do more than 
merely raise a conjecture or show a probability. 
Where there are probabilities the other way 
equally or more potent the deductions are mere 
guesses and the jury should not be permitted to 
speculate. The rule is well estab1ished in this 
jurisdiction that where "the proximate cause of 
the injury is left to conjecture, the plaintiff 
must fail as a matter of law." [Cites omitted.] 
Many cases are cited in support of this pro~usition 
and the court quoted with approv~l £rom 29 Cyc. 625 
where it is stated: "The evidence must, however, 
do more than merely raise a conjecture or show a 
probability as to the cause of the injury, and no 
recovery can be had if the evidence leaves it to 
conjecture which of two probable causes resulted 
in the injury, where defendant was liable £or 
only one of them." 
279 P.2d at 1083. 
Further, negligence is not actionable if an inter-
vening act was the proximate cause of the injury: 
But it is the plaintiff's burden to establish 
that such prior negligence was the proximate cause 
of the subsequent injury. This entails the 
requirement that the subsequent injury be one 
which might reasonably be expected to follow from 
the original act and injury; and without any new 
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and independent, unforeseeable occurrence which 
effectively caused the second injury. If there 
is such a later causative occurrence, it is 
deemed to be the intervening, efficient and 
therefore the proximate cause of such injury. 
Skollingsberg v. Brookover, 484 P.2d 1177, 1179-80 (Utah, 1971). 
As the Nevada Supreme Court said in another wrongful 
death action: 
Negligence, is not actionable unless, 
without the intervention of an intervening 
cause, it proximately causes the harm for which 
complaint was made. An intervening cause means 
not a concurrent and contributing cause but a 
superseding cause which is itself the natural 
and logical cause of the harm. 
~ 
Thomas v. Bokelrnan, supra, 462 P.2d at 1022. 
In Cooke v. Mortensen, supra, this Court held that an 
injury sustained by a tenant while trying to open a window 
which had been negligently painted shut by the landlord could 
not be attributed to the landlord's negligence because the 
tenant's intervening negligence was the proximate cause: 
Further, and again assuming defendants' 
negligence, we concur with the trial court that 
the landlords' failure to unstick a window could 
not reasonably be calculated to result in the 
injury incurred herein. Rather, this injury was 
caused by the independent and intervenery action 
of the plaintiff. When there exist two possible 
causes for an injury, and these causes are 
independent of each other, the later and inter-
vening cause is generally to be viewed as the 
proximate cause of the accident. 
624 P.2d at 676. 
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In the present case, there is no evidence at all 
which shows that the Division of Family Services' negligence 
(if any) in not providing protective headgear to Jennifer 
Little was causally related to her death. A helmet may have 
helped to prevent Jennifer from bruising herself, while 
head-banging, but there is no affirmative link between 
the head-banging and lack of headgear and the death. 
Plaintiff below attempted at length to show 
through the testimony of Dr. Serge Moore that Jennifer's 
dea~h may have been caused by the "aggregate trauma" of 
continuous episodes of head-banging(T .. pp. 99-100). How-
ever, Dr. Moore testified that the blow which caused 
Jennifer's death did not result from her banging her own 
head against a solid object, such as a wall or toilet 
(T. p. 105). Further, he testified that the headbanging 
and aggregate trauma theref rorn ought to be considered as 
a possible contributing factor in the death (T. pp. 117-118). 
However, a final, significant blow would have been necessary 
to cause death in any case; "the smaller injuries alone, the 
bruises alone, would not have caused her death." (T. p. 119). 
Furthermore, the final single episode could ver~ well have 
caused the death itself, whether there was aggregate ~yauma or 
not (T .. p. 119). Dr. Moore also testified that the final bl\..~~T 
which caused Jennifer's death was not the result of banging 
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her head against a solid object, but rather was the result 
of being hit by a blunt object with a soft structure 
covering it, such as a hand or fist (T. p. 110). 
The police reports, which were admitted into 
evidence, show that Floyd Hooten, the 17-year-old foster 
brother, did strike Jennifer Little with his hand or fist 
several times. Jennifer's death followed immediately. This 
evidence is undisputed. Floyd Hooten's actions were the 
proximate cause of the death. While the aggregate trauma 
,_ 
from the head-banging may have contributed to the death, and 
that is mere speculation, the death would not have occurred 
without the final blows by Hooten; and, the death might, at 
least as probably, have occurred as a result of Hooten's 
blows alone, aggregate trauma or not. 
In Widefield Hornes, Inc. v. Griego, 416 P.2d 365 
(Colo., 1966), the Supreme Court of Colorado held: 
In order to make out a prima f acie 
case, the plaintiff's proof was required 
to show that the alleged defective __ 
construction of the drain cover was, to say 
the least, the probable cause of plaintiff's 
injuries; in this case, however, it is only 
one of several possible causes. We have 
heretofore held that where the state of the 
record is sufficient to establish only a 
possible connection between an act or 
condition and a result, it is not sufficient 
in law to impose liability. We cannot affirm 
a judgment based upon mere possibilities as the 
law deals only in probability and reasonably 
established fact. 
416 P.2d at 366-367. 
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Similarly, in a wrongful death case, the Alaska 
Supreme Court held: 
A mere possibility of causation is 
not enough. When the matter remains one 
of conjecture, as it does here, the trial 
court must find against the party carrying 
the burden of proof. 
City of Fairbanks v. Schaible, 375 P.2d 201, 204 (Alaska, 1962) 
In the instant case, the "negligence" of the Divisior 
of Family Service in not providing a helmet to Jennifer Little 
for protection from head-banging is only a possible contributins 
fac~or, certainly not the sole cause, and very probably not eve 
a contributing cause of death. Assessment of liability against 
the Division of Family Services based upon such "neg1igence," 
with no proximate cause, was clear error. 
Although the lower court made no finding whatsoever 
of causation during the oral ruling at the close of trial, 
and the defendants objected to any such finding suddenly 
appearing in the written findings several weeks later (R. 
pp. 150-153), it is instructive to note that, by in~~lineatio1 
the Judge acknowledged that the death actually resulted from 
the blows by Floyd Hooten (R. p. 161), and only that protectiv~ 
headgear might have reduced the risk of harm from head banging. 
It is clear that the proximate cause of Jennifer 
Little's death was the actions of Floyd Hooten, which are not 
attributable to the Division of Family Services (see Point III 
supra). The written Findings of Fact assert that the Division 
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of Family Services was negligent due to "lack of proper 
supervision at all times as indicated by allowing the 
child to be left under the supervision and care of Floyd 
t " Hoo en. . . (R. pp. 160-161; Defendants' Objection, 
R. p. 153). As has been previously discussed, ther~ was 
absolutely no reason for the Division of Family Services 
to foresee that Jennifer Little might be harmed if left 
in the care of Floyd Hooten. 
There is. a duty to take affirmative 
action to control the wrongfu~-acts of 
third persons only where the [defendant] 
. . . has reasonable cause to anticipate 
such act and the probability of injury 
resulting therefrom. 
Thomas v. Bokelman, supra, 462 P.2d at 1022. 
Further, the duty to supervise a child in placement 
does not extend to the point of insuring that nothing will 
ever happen to that child. 
In Sly v. Board of Education of Kansas City, 516 
P.2d 895 (Kansas, 1973), and Schafer v. State of Montana 
Department of Institutions, 592 P.2d 493 (Montana, 1979), 
governmental agencies were held to have the duty to supervise 
a particular individual or group of individuals. However, 
in both cases the Supreme Courts refused to find that this 
duty extended to include the duty to prevent unforeseeable 
intervening events from occurring. Both courts found in cases 
where an unforseeable intervening event is the cause of the 
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injury that lack of supervision on the part of the agency is 
not the proximate cause and the agency is not liable for 
the resulting injury. Both cases also expressly stated 
that to hold otherwise would be to place the duty of an 
insurer on the agency, which was not intended. 
In the Schafer case, which involved injuries to a 
girl committed to the custody of the State Department of 
Institutions, the court conunented on the role of agency 
supervision in preventing the unforseen acts of third 
pe~sons. The in]ury to the child, caused by the negligence 
of a third person driving an automobile, "easily could have 
occurred no matter what type of supervision the State exercised 
over her, short of locking her in a room somewhere. Such 
restrictive detention is not the goal of our juvenile 
institutions and programs." 592 P.2d at 496. 
Similarly, no reasonable amount of supervision by 
the Division of Family Services worker could have guaranteed 
that Jennifer Little would not be injured by Floyd aooten. 
The only way to provide such supervision would be to remove 
children from individual foster homes and place them in 
closed institutions where they could be under 24-hour watch. 
The lower court not only made no supportable finding 
of proximate cause, but in fact stated that the cause of 
death (in a wrongful death action) was of no particular 
importance. There was no showing that any negligence on the 
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part of the Division of Family Services was the proximate cause 
of Jennifer Little's death, and the judgment should be 
reversed. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing discussion, the Appellant 
Division of Family Services requests the Court to reverse the 
district court's denial of the Motion to Dismiss based upon 
the substantive provisions of the Utah Governmental Immunity 
Act. Further, the Appellants request re~eFsal of th~ 
final judgment rendered against the Division of Family 
Services. 
Dated this 31st day of March, 1982. 
Respectfully submitted, 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Attorney General 
SHARON PEACOCK 
Assistant Attorney General 
CRAIG L. BARLOW 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Appellants 
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Fifth East, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, this 31st day of 
March, 1982. 
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